Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America

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Does it matter that working-class citizens are numerically underrepresented in political offices throughout the world? For decades, the conventional wisdom in comparative politics has been that it does not, that lawmakers from different classes think and behave roughly the same in office. In this article, we argue that this conclusion is misguided. Past research relied on inappropriate measures of officeholders’ class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices. Using data on 18 Latin American legislatures, we show that lawmakers from different classes bring different economic attitudes to the legislative process. Using data on one least likely case, we also show that pre-voting decisions like sponsoring legislation often differ dramatically along social class lines, even when political parties control higher-visibility decisions like roll-call votes. The unequal numerical or descriptive representation of social classes in the world’s legislatures has important consequences for the substantive representation of different class interests.

In most countries, political decision makers are drawn disproportionately from the top strata of society. As Matthews (1985, 18) noted a quarter century ago, “almost everywhere legislators are better educated, possess higher-status occupations, and have more privileged backgrounds than the people they ‘represent.’” Citizens from the working class—from manual labor and service industry jobs—rarely hold office. People from white-collar professions do most of the work in the world’s legislatures (e.g., Best 2007; Best and Cotta 2000).

Although these inequalities in the numerical or descriptive representation (Pitkin 1967) of social classes are a defining feature of political life in most countries, we still know little about how they affect the substantive representation of different classes’ interests. Does the near absence of the working class in legislatures affect who wins and who loses in the policymaking process? Scholars briefly pondered this question in the 1960s and 1970s, but research on this topic came to a halt after a handful of studies suggested that policy makers from different classes behave about the same in office. Ever since, the idea that legislators’ class backgrounds are irrelevant has been the conventional wisdom in the study of comparative politics.

There are signs that this wisdom should be revisited. As scholars of legislative decision making have shifted their attention from roll-call voting to other activities like sponsoring legislation, they have begun to recognize that policy makers have far more personal discretion than researchers once believed (e.g., Parker 1992). Recent work on legislators’ gender and ethnicity has shown that the...
personal characteristics of legislators can affect the kinds of policies they sponsor or support (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clots-Figueras 2009; Franck and Rainer 2012; Pande 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Decades of research on mass political behavior have shown that the attitudes and choices of people all over the world are divided by class (e.g., Evans 2000; Hayes 1995; Korpi 1983; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Similar social class divisions have been found in the conduct of lawmakers in the United States (Carnes 2012, 2013), a country where class consciousness is weak by comparative standards (Brooks 1994; Devine 1997). Findings like these beg the question: Should scholars be paying more attention to the unequal representation of social classes in the world’s political institutions? As we explore how the ethnic and gender backgrounds of lawmakers affect their choices, should we also be developing a research agenda on their social class backgrounds?

This article argues that we should. The first wave of research on class and representation often used problematic measures of legislators’ class backgrounds and attitudes and focused primarily on legislative voting, the activity that affords policy makers the least personal discretion. In doing so, this research overlooked important differences in how lawmakers from different classes think and behave—and led many scholars to underestimate the importance of inequalities in the social class makeup of legislatures.

Using data on 18 Latin American countries, we show that lawmakers from different classes bring different economic attitudes to the legislative process. Because of the tight discipline political parties exercise over legislative voting in much of the region, these attitudinal differences may not translate into differences in how lawmakers cast their votes. During the agenda-setting stages of the legislative process, however, parties wield less influence, and legislators from different classes often act on their distinct political perspectives. Using data on Argentina, we show how focusing on roll-call voting obscures these processes and how simply studying a pre-voting legislative activity—bill sponsorship—leads us to view the unequal representation of social classes in an entirely different light.

Class and Representation in Comparative Perspective

In the 1970s, comparative scholars largely gave up on the idea that the class composition of a legislature mattered. Descriptive research on the social backgrounds of political elites had surged in the 1960s (e.g., Domhoff 1967; Gruber 1971; Lipset and Solari 1967; Verner 1974; Von der Mehden 1969). Political scientists had collected data on legislators’ educations, occupations, and childhoods. But after more than a decade, scholars interested in the class backgrounds of political decision makers had yet to offer concrete evidence of a link between class and elite conduct. A few had asked whether legislators with different levels of education behaved differently, but they “found little or no consistent impact of the quantity of education a leader has received” (Putnam 1976, 94). Many had assumed that lawmakers from working-class families or occupations brought different perspectives to office, but few had bothered to test that assumption. Many scholars eventually concluded, as Putnam (1976, 93) did, that although “the assumption of a correlation between attitude and social origin lies behind most studies of the social backgrounds of elites, . . . most of the available evidence tends to disconfirm this assumption.”

Since then, scholars have frequently reaffirmed Putnam’s negative assessment of research on class and legislative conduct. In the mid-1980s, Matthews (1985, 25) argued that the available evidence was “scattered and inconclusive” and “certainly [did] not add up to a finding that the . . . economic . . . biases of legislative recruitment result in a . . . policy bias of legislative institutions.” A decade later, Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 12) noted that research still had “not clearly established that the social background of politicians has a significant influence on their attitudes, values and behaviour.” In the absence of any hard evidence to the contrary, the idea that the class makeup of the world’s political institutions does not matter became the conventional wisdom in comparative politics.

However, this conventional wisdom is less a reflection of what scholars know than what scholars do not know. Comparative research on class and legislative conduct has been rare. When scholars say that past work “has not clearly established that the social background of politicians has a significant influence,” it is not because dozens of studies have asked whether class is related to legislative conduct and concluded that it is not. It is because, for the most part, scholars have not asked.

The few who have, moreover, often have not relied on standard theories about class or legislative conduct to guide their empirical work. Although most social class analysts regard occupation as the ideal measure of a person’s place in a society’s economic and status structure (e.g., Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1995; Manza and Brooks 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2005), comparative research on legislators’ class backgrounds has focused largely on educational attainment and
scholars of comparative politics have not really focused on other topics, such as feelings of efficacy and representational styles (Kim and Woo 1972; Previtt, Eulau, and Zisk 1966). And whereas legislative scholars recognize that lawmakers have little personal discretion when casting their votes (Burden 2007; Hall 1996)—especially where electoral rules give parties considerable leverage (Rae 1971)—and that most of the important decisions about which problems get on the agenda happen long before the final passage vote (Kingdon [1984] 2011), most comparative research on class and legislative conduct has focused on roll-call voting (Best 2011). Scholars of comparative politics have not really rejected the idea that a legislator’s class background might matter—they have never given the idea a fair hearing.

A fair hearing may well lead to a different verdict. Other legislator characteristics, such as gender and ethnicity, seem to have important consequences. In India, policy outcomes differ depending on the proportion of lawmakers who are women (Pande 2003) or from lower castes (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). In the United States and Western Europe, female legislators behave differently than male legislators (Bratton and Ray 2002; Kittilson 2008; Mansbridge 1999). In Africa, lawmakers from certain ethnic backgrounds improve their ethnic group’s well-being (Franck and Rainer 2012; McClendon 2012). And in Latin America, female legislators consistently hold different political attitudes and initiate different legislation than their male counterparts (e.g., Jones 1997; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003). When scholars measure legislators’ personal characteristics and choices carefully, they often find that political institutions with different social compositions produce different kinds of policies.

Could the same be true of class? Could the social class makeup of a legislature matter after all? On its face, the idea seems plausible. Scholars who study the gender and ethnic backgrounds of politicians often also consider their social backgrounds (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo 2012; Mateos Diaz 1997; Schwindt-Bayer 2006, 2011). They may be right to do so. If lawmakers from different classes are like ordinary citizens, they will tend to bring different attitudes to public office, especially on economic issues. If lawmakers’ values and policy preferences persist after they are elected—if they tend not to change their minds much (as scholars have found in the United States; e.g., Carnes 2013, chap. 2; Poole 2007)—legislators from different classes may tend to behave differently years after they are elected. Although lawmakers’ choices are often constrained by other actors (constituents, parties, etc.), most lawmakers have some leeway some of the time. If they look inward for guidance in those instances—if they base their choices on their own views—and if legislators from different classes have different views, their behaviors will tend to differ by class in ways that mirror social class gaps in public opinion (Burden 2007, chap. 2).

Scholars have long recognized that people in different places in a society’s economic or status structure tend to have different views about politics, particularly about the government’s role in economic affairs. This may be because of simple self-interest; people with fewer resources may favor greater redistribution, for instance (e.g., Melzer and Richard 1981). Or it may be because people in different social strata tend to develop different political and ideological habits over time (Piketty 1995) and tend to associate with other people from their classes, which reinforces those habits (Keely and Tan 2008; Manza and Brooks 2008). Whatever the exact reason, political attitudes and behaviors all over the world are often sharply divided by class, with the less fortunate typically more supportive of leftist economic policies and the more affluent more supportive of right-wing politics (e.g., Evans 2000; Hayes 1995; Korpi 1983; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).

The most pronounced social class divisions typically revolve around labor market divisions, that is, differences in how people earn a living—their occupations. Even after decades of research, “reasonable people [still] disagree about the best way to define” (Lareau 2008, 4) social classes. Still, most class analysts agree that any measure of class should be rooted in occupational information. Occupational backgrounds tend to be strong predictors of other measures, such as income, social status, and the class labels people assign to themselves (Hout 2008; Katz 1972, 63).

Occupations, moreover, are more plausible drivers of what people think about public policy than many other measures. Composite “socioeconomic status” indexes often obscure the relationship between political

1 The rare scholars who have avoided these pitfalls have found clear evidence that legislators from different occupations have different perspectives on several issues (Edinger and Searing 1967; Esaas and Holmberg 1996; Nagel 1998; Searing 1969), but their insights have largely been ignored.

2 As Manza and Brooks (2008, 204) succinctly put it: Occupation provides the most plausible basis for thinking about how specifically class-related political micro processes and influences occur. . . . Workplace settings provide the possibility of talking about politics and forging political identity, and work also provides a
It comes to political attitudes, the most important aspect of a person’s place in society seems to be how she earns a living, not how much she earns, how much education she received, or her parents’ place in society.

These observations cast serious doubt on the conclusions drawn in the first wave of comparative research on class and representation. If differences in legislative attitudes mirror differences in public attitudes, it makes little sense to study educational attainment and parental socialization—which predict modest and inconsistent differences in public opinion—or feelings of legislative efficacy and representational style—which have little to do with the economic issues that divide public opinion along class lines. If legislators only act on their class-contingent political attitudes when they have some discretion, it makes little sense to focus only on roll-call voting, the most tightly constrained form of legislative conduct. It should come as no surprise that so many past studies failed to find a connection between class and legislative attitudes or behavior: Many relied on the wrong measures of class, the wrong measures of legislative attitudes, and the wrong measures of legislative conduct.

If we wish to know whether the unequal class compositions of the world’s governments affect the policies they enact, we need to know whether lawmakers from different occupations think differently about economic issues and behave differently when they have some leeway. In short, we need reliable information about lawmakers’ class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices.

**Evidence from Latin America**

Latin America is an ideal place to reconsider old ideas about class and representation. In terms of how important class is in politics, Latin American democracies run the gamut (see, e.g., Kitschelt et al. 2010; Roberts 2002). Figure 1 uses data from the 2008 Americas Barometer to illustrate how working-class respondents differed from businesspeople and professionals—the two occupational groups that tend to differ most sharply in the literature on class and public opinion in Latin America—on a simple but probing question about their economic views: an item that asked how strongly the respondent agreed that “The [country name] government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country” (AmericasBarometer translation). The bars in Figure 1 show the degree to which the responses of each group differed. Values to the right of zero mean that
working-class respondents supported more state ownership than businesspeople and professionals; values to the left of zero reflect cases where businesspeople and professionals favored state ownership more often than working-class respondents.

On average, class divisions in Latin America overlap substantially with ideological divisions: Workers prefer more statist policies, and businesspeople and professionals are more market oriented (cf. Lupu and Stokes 2009; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). In some countries, this division is pronounced (e.g., Argentina and Peru); in others (e.g., Paraguay), class divisions are considerably murkier. This diversity makes Latin America a useful setting for making larger generalizations about class and legislative decision making—and certainly a substantial improvement over past studies that focus on just one atypical democracy (Carnes 2012, 2013).

Moreover, scholars already know a great deal about legislative politics in Latin America (e.g., Morgenstern 2004; Morgenstern and Nacif 2002), and about the effects of Latin American legislators’ gender, ethnic, and political backgrounds (e.g., Htun, Lacalle, and Miccozi 2013; Jones 1997; Jones et al. 2002; Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Studying the classes Latin American legislatures come from is not a journey into the wilderness. To the contrary, it is a chance to follow—and build upon—the paths blazed by others.

Latin America is also ideal for practical reasons. To understand the effects of the unequal representation of social classes, we need to know which classes lawmakers came from, what attitudes and perspectives they brought to office, and how they behaved once elected. We also need data on other factors that could influence how legislators think and act. In Latin America, these data are well within reach.

For over a decade, the University of Salamanca (USAL) has conducted confidential, representative surveys of Latin American legislators (which have already provoked a flurry of research; e.g., Alcántara Sáez 2008; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Saiegh 2009). The USAL surveys asked lawmakers about their personal views on several issues, including multiple questions about the government’s role in the economy, the topic that typically elicits the most pronounced social class divisions in public opinion. The surveys also asked legislators about their prior occupations.7 With these data, we can easily measure the relationship between class and lawmakers’ economic attitudes. We focus on the second wave of USAL surveys, which was administered in the late 1990s and early 2000s.8 Our sample includes 1,569 legislators spanning the array of parties in Latin America’s 18 major democracies.

Latin America is also ideal for studying class-based differences in legislative conduct. Several governments in Latin America publish data on legislative behavior, including both roll-call votes and agenda-setting decisions like bill sponsorships. In this article, we focus on one case: Argentina. Social class divisions in public opinion are strong in Argentina (see Figure 1). However, political parties have enormous power in the Argentine legislature thanks to closed-list elections that allow local party leaders to determine which lawmakers will have a chance to run for reelection (Jones 2002; Jones et al. 2002; Morgenstern 2004). As a result, party discipline in Argentina is among the highest in the region (Carey 2007; Jones and Hwang 2005). That makes Argentina an ideal case for testing our theory: Public opinion is divided by class, but with such strong parties, we should be unlikely to find a relationship between lawmakers’ class backgrounds and their choices in office. If there are links between class and legislative conduct in Argentina, there are probably even stronger links in other countries where class matters in politics (Gerring 2007).

If legislators from different classes bring different attitudes to the policymaking process, responses to the USAL survey’s questions about economic issues should differ by class in the same way that public opinion typically

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5Our theory implies that class differences among legislators should be more pronounced where class divisions are sharper among the public. There are many possible explanations for why class divisions are clearer in some countries than others. As one reviewer suggested, the indigenous leaders in Bolivia and Ecuador may explain why the social class gaps in public opinion are smallest in those two countries.

6The surveys randomly sample each legislature, stratifying by party without replacement. Interviews are conducted in person. These samples include, on average, 67% of the legislature and range from 25% (Mexico) to 93% (Ecuador). The average response rate among surveyed legislators is 95.4%.

7Specifically, the surveys asked, “What was your primary activity prior to being elected Deputy? In other words, what did your work specifically consist of? I am referring to your primary occupation, the one that earned you the most income.” It would be preferable to know the complete occupational history of each legislator, but the surveys only asked about the last job the legislator had. However, research on the United States has found that studying the last occupation a legislator had and studying the legislature’s complete occupational history produce similar results (Carnes 2013, chap. 2) because many legislators work in similar jobs throughout their prepolitical careers.

8Guatemala’s second-wave survey used a different questionnaire. We therefore included data from the first wave for Guatemala, which was administered to the lawmakers who served in the 1995–99 session. Since Brazil was not included in the first or second wave, we use data from the third wave, administered during the 2003–7 session. Excluding Guatemala and Brazil does not alter our findings.
differs. Legislators from the working class should retain the working class’s more leftist economic attitudes. Legislators from white-collar jobs—especially those from the private sector—should retain their class’s more rightist economic views. And these attitudinal differences should manifest themselves in the behavior of Argentine legislators in office, at least when they have the leeway to use their discretion.

Class and Descriptive Representation in Latin America

As in other regions, the class compositions of legislatures in Latin America are sharply biased. Lawmakers from the working class are rare. Latin American legislatures—like political institutions the world over—are overwhelmingly run by white-collar professionals.

Using the USAL surveys, we classified legislators into seven categories based on their prior occupations: blue-collar workers, service-based professionals (e.g., teachers and social workers), career politicians, lawyers, military and law enforcement personnel, private-sector professionals, and businesspeople. We then used data from the International Labor Organization (ILO) to classify the citizens in each country the same way.

Figure 2 compares the distributions of social classes in Latin American legislatures and in Latin American populations. As the top panel illustrates, the region’s legislatures are overwhelmingly composed of white-collar professionals. Only about 5–20% of lawmakers in each country come from the working class. This pattern is even evident in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, where major political parties have close ties to unions. Rodrigues (2009) has shown that in Brazil, even the legislators elected from the Worker’s Party tend to be lawyers and businesspeople (see also Rodrigues 2006). The same

These categories strike a good balance between specificity and precision: The USAL survey was a modest-sized sample with coarse occupational information, so any occupational coding scheme with more than seven or eight categories would likely have too few cases in many groups. Our coding scheme, moreover, is similar to many that have been used to study public opinion (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995), legislative conduct (Carnes 2012), and political recruitment (Rehren 2001). Our measure also produces sensible estimates; for instance, the class distribution of Brazilian legislators in our sample closely parallels Rodrigue’s (2009) measure. Our coding of Latin American citizens below is also consistent with prior research, although we combine informal and formal workers (e.g., Portes and Hoffman 2003; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).

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10The ILO did not have data for the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.

Class and Substantive Representation in Latin America

Do these inequalities in the descriptive representation of social classes in Latin America actually matter? Do legislators from different lines of work bring different substantive perspectives to office? When class, attitudes,
and choices are all measured appropriately, the answer appears to be yes.

**Legislative Attitudes**

In Latin America, lawmakers from different classes bring distinct economic preferences to office. Figure 4 plots legislators’ average responses to two questions about economic issues in the USAL survey. One asked about lawmakers’ personal views on 10 economic policy areas: price controls, free primary education, free secondary

11 Specifically, the question asked, “I’d like your opinion on a range of traditional state functions. Thinking in general terms, tell me for each one of them, how much intervention should the state engage in: a lot, some, a little, or none?”
FIGURE 3 The Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Latin American Legislatures

Note: Bars report the difference between the percentage of working-class adults in each country and the percentage of each country’s legislators from the working class.

Sources: USAL surveys and ILO.

education, free university education, public housing, guaranteed employment, social security, environmental regulations, unemployment insurance, and basic needs provisions. Another asked about their views on seven spending items: infrastructure, health and social security, public safety, education, unemployment, housing, and pensions. Social class divisions were evident in lawmakers’ responses to both questions. The top panel of Figure 4 plots the percentage of the 10 state functions legislators felt should receive little or no government intervention. The bottom panel plots the percentage of the seven social programs that legislators felt should receive the same or lower expenditures. In both panels, then, higher values on the vertical axis correspond to less interventionist (more rightist) views about the government’s role in economic affairs. The basic social class divisions in Latin American legislative attitudes are obvious. Like ordinary citizens, lawmakers from white-collar professions tend to have more rightist views. Lawmakers from the working class, on the other hand, tend to take a more leftist perspective. With appropriate measures, “the assumption of a correlation between attitude and social origin” appears quite sound.

Moreover, this correlation appears to be genuine: Regressions that controlled for a variety of other potential determinants of legislative attitudes reached the same basic conclusion. Table 1 reports the results of four ordinary least squares models. The first pair regresses the percentage of state functions legislators preferred to be small or nonexistent on occupational indicators and, in the second model, controls for the legislator’s party, race, country, religion, gender, age, and marital status. Likewise, the second pair of models relates the percentage of social spending items lawmakers felt should receive the same or lower expenditures to occupational indicators and, in the last model, the same set of controls. In all four models, we omitted the worker category: The coefficients in

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12 The Brazil and Panama surveys collapsed primary and secondary education.

13 The question asked, “Now I will mention several public expenditures. Please tell me whether you believe that your country should spend more or less on each one of them.”
FIGURE 4  Class and Economic Attitudes in Latin American Legislatures

Percentage of 10 State Functions That Legislators Felt Should Receive Little or No Intervention

Percentage of 7 Social Programs That Legislators Felt Should Receive the Same or Lower Expenditures

Note: Superscripts denote whether a simple t-test found that the average for the group in question was statistically distinct from the average for former workers.

*p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, two tailed.

Source: USAL surveys.
Table 1 can be thought of as estimates of the average difference (on a 0 to 100 scale) between lawmakers from the working class and those from the occupation in question. Lawmakers from most white-collar professions were significantly more rightist than lawmakers from the working class, regardless of whether we included control variables. The differences, moreover, were substantial. Compared to a legislator from the working class, the average lawmaker from a business background wanted the state to have little or no involvement in 5.5 (with controls) to 7.5 (without controls) percentage points more of the state functions listed in the survey. She wanted to maintain was noisier than the combined index—but nothing in these analyses (reported in Tables A3 and A4 in the online appendix) caused us to question the basic conclusions reported here.

Table 1: Regression Models Relating Class and Latin American Legislators’ Economic Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>State Functions</th>
<th>Social Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessperson</td>
<td>7.52**</td>
<td>5.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-Sector Professional</td>
<td>7.60**</td>
<td>5.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/Law Enforcement</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.31)</td>
<td>(4.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>8.74**</td>
<td>6.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>7.75**</td>
<td>5.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
<td>(1.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-Based Professional</td>
<td>9.79**</td>
<td>4.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.54)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker (omitted)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1569</td>
<td>1326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.1468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Err.</td>
<td>24.597</td>
<td>17.623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cells report coefficients from regressions relating the percentage of neutral or right positions legislators took on questions about state interventions and social spending to occupational indicators and (in the second and fourth models) controls for party, country, religion, gender, age, and marital status. Coefficients for control variables and the “no info” occupation are omitted but available in Table A5 in the online appendix.

+ \( p < .10 \), \( * p < .05 \), \( ** p < .01 \), two tailed.

Source: USAL surveys.

Overall, the gaps documented in Table 1 were sizable; in the second model, for instance, the average gap between lawmakers from the most ideologically distinct major parties in Argentina (at the time, the Peronist Party and FREPASO) was 7.3 points, only slightly larger than the estimated gap between lawmakers from the most ideologically distinct social classes (even after controlling for party). In sharp contrast to the notion that class is irrelevant in the world’s legislatures, former professionals and blue-collar workers in Latin American

or reduce spending on 5.1 to 7.6 percentage points more of the major social projects the survey covered. Adding controls reduced two point estimates just below statistical significance in the last model (although with so many controls and so few cases from the working class, this is probably to be expected). Moreover, if any of the controls were themselves driven by the legislators’ class, the two models with controls could understate the total association between class and lawmakers’ attitudes. If, for instance, some legislators choose to affiliate with a left-leaning party because they come from working-class occupations, controlling for party as we do here will lead us to underestimate the importance of class.

15 Many of the control variables in our models (presented in their entirety in Table A5 in the online appendix) also predicted sensible differences in legislators’ economic attitudes. Legislators from right-leaning parties were significantly more likely to report holding right-leaning views. Male legislators were slightly (though nonsignificantly) more likely to report right-leaning opinions. Catholic respondents were farther to the right than atheists. Class is an important dividing line in how legislators think about economic issues, but it is by no means the only one.
legislatures appear to differ markedly in their support for government interventions in economic affairs.\footnote{To test our assumption that occupations were the best way to measure class, we replicated the analysis in Table 1 using data on legislators’ education levels and parental backgrounds (see Table A6 in the online appendix). As expected, these alternative class measures were not significantly associated with legislative attitudes in any meaningful pattern. Unfortunately, we could not carry out a similar analysis using income or wealth because the USAL survey did not ask about these items.}

Of course, the differences between lawmakers from different classes could reflect differences in the constituencies that legislators from working-class and from white-collar jobs represent: It could be that more leftist or more working-class districts tend to elect working-class legislators, who would in turn have incentives to support leftist policies regardless of their personal backgrounds. Unfortunately, we cannot control for constituent opinion directly because public opinion surveys in Latin America do not allow us to generate reliable district-level averages.

However, we have little reason to believe that constituency effects are behind these findings. The USAL survey was optional, was confidential, and focused on legislators’ personal views, not the positions they take publicly. Legislators were not asked, “How will you vote on economic policy?”—they were asked about their opinions and what they believed. And they seem to have answered truthfully. More than 95\% of legislators agreed to take the survey, and many routinely responded in ways that suggest they were not simply saying what their constituents wanted to hear. For instance, 59\% acknowledged that public involvement in their party was “scarce and marginal,” and 17\% even admitted that they side with their party when conflicts arise between the interests of their party and their constituents. The legislators who completed the USAL survey seemed to take off their halos and respond truthfully to questions about how they make decisions in office.

Consistent with this view, we found the same results when we reanalyzed the USAL surveys from Argentina using additional controls for several province characteristics that often predict public opinion: the urbanization rate, the literacy rate, the proportion of the adult population working in agriculture or fishing, the proportion of the adult population working in manufacturing or mining, and the poverty rate.\footnote{These data are from Argentina’s 2001 census.} The results were less statistically precise (owing to the fact that our sample size was just 122, less than a tenth the size of the samples used in Table 1), but the occupational coefficients (reported in the second and fourth models in Table A7 in the online appendix) were all comparable to those reported in Table 1. Regardless of what kinds of districts they represent (or their parties or other characteristics), lawmakers from the working class appear to bring distinct perspectives to the world’s legislatures.

**Legislative Behavior**

Do these perspectives affect legislative conduct? To answer this question, we gathered data on the class backgrounds and behavior of legislators in Argentina. Since 2000, members of the Argentine lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, have reported their prior occupations to a nongovernmental organization, Directorio Legislativo.\footnote{Like the USAL survey, these data include only the legislator’s last occupation. Data from Directorio Legislativo are also used by Franceschet and Piscopo (2012; 2014).}

We matched these data\footnote{The distribution of occupations in this data set was similar to the distribution in the USAL Argentina survey, although the share of lawmakers classified as lawyers was lower and the share of former politicians was higher (see Figure A1 in the online appendix). These categories are grouped together in our analysis, so this subtle difference does not affect our results.} with two measures of how legislators behave: how they vote and the kinds of bills they sponsor. Of all the things lawmakers do in office, casting roll-call votes is by far the most aggressively policed by parties, interest groups, and concerned citizens. When making other kinds of choices, however, legislators often enjoy a great deal more freedom. Writing about the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, for instance, Alemán et al. (2009, 110) note that “the constraints imposed by party leaders on floor votes . . . are considered to be more stringent than those imposed on cosponsored bill initiatives.”

Introducing bills, however, is no less consequential than voting—and may in fact be more important in the long run (Hall 1996). The bills that are introduced in a legislature determine which problems make it onto the agenda and which solutions lawmakers contemplate. If no legislator is willing to propose a given policy, it cannot be considered or debated, let alone enacted. Parties and other actors exert less influence during the pre-voting stages of the legislative process—but in most legislatures, what happens before the votes are cast is just as important as what happens on center stage.\footnote{Scholars studying how gender and ethnicity affect legislator behavior in Latin America similarly emphasize the crucial agenda-setting stage (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi 2013; Schwindt-Bayer 2006).}

Like previous studies (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997), we measure legislative voting using ideal points, composite scores based on every vote cast in a session that identify the major ideological divisions within an
To measure bill sponsorship, we use data from Alemán et al. (2009) compiled. We focus on the bills introduced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in 2000 and 2001, the two years that coincide with the legislative session for which we have USAL data on lawmakers’ personal views. First, two research assistants based in Argentina identified the 464 bills introduced in 2000 and the 341 in 2001 that dealt primarily with the kinds of economic policies that the USAL survey had asked about (out of a total of 3,514 bills proposed during the session). They then coded whether each of these economic bills called for more (left) or less (right) government intervention and computed the number of each type of bill that each legislator sponsored or cosponsored. That is, we coded a bill as a more (or less) interventionist economic bill only if both research assistants agreed that it was both an economic bill and a more (or less) interventionist proposal.

The USAL survey revealed that legislators from different class backgrounds bring different economic attitudes to office. We argued that those differences are likely to be invisible in roll-call voting, where parties powerfully influence how legislators vote. But if scholars are right that parties wield less power in the agenda-setting stages of the legislative process, our data should reveal class-based differences in the kinds of bills Argentine legislators sponsor.

Figure 5 plots estimated class-based differences in Argentine lawmakers’ spending attitudes, bill sponsorship choices, and roll-call votes. Because this pool of legislators is smaller and because lawmakers from the various non-working-class occupations differed so little, we collapsed the seven occupational categories used in the preceding analysis into three groups: white-collar private-sector jobs (businesspeople and private-sector professionals), white-collar public-sector jobs (military or law enforcement personnel, lawyers, politicians, and service-based professionals), and blue-collar jobs (workers).

The bars in Figure 5 report the results of regression models that relate Argentine legislators’ attitudes, bill proposals, and roll-call votes to an indicator for lawmakers who worked in white-collar jobs in the private sector, an indicator for lawmakers from white-collar jobs in the public sector (those employed in blue-collar jobs were the omitted category), and political party bloc indicator variables, which should account for the fact that working-class legislators are more often drawn from left-leaning parties. Each dependent variable in Figure 5 was scaled to range from 0 to 100 (where a score of 0 was the most interventionist or leftist position possible and a score of 100 was the most rightist position), so the estimates in the figure can be interpreted as the average difference on a 0 to 100 scale between a lawmaker from the working class (since they were the omitted category, they always have a score of 0) and lawmakers from different white-collar professions, controlling for party.

Like Latin American legislators more generally, Argentine lawmakers’ personal views about social spending differ dramatically by class. The first set of bars in Figure 5 illustrates expected differences in the percentage of seven government programs each lawmaker felt should receive the same or less funding (the measure used in the bottom panel of Figure 4). Even after controlling for party, Argentine lawmakers from private-sector professions tend to have spending views approximately 25 points (out of 100) more rightist than lawmakers from blue-collar jobs, and lawmakers from public-sector professions tend to have views about 14 points further to the right. Like other lawmakers in the region, Argentine legislators from the working class tend to hold more leftist economic views.

These attitudinal differences appear to translate into comparable differences in their choices, at least when they have some discretion. The second set of bars in Figure 5 plots the percentage of the economic bills that legislators sponsored or cosponsored that were rightist. The third
FIGURE 5 Estimated Class-Based Differences in How Argentine Legislators Think, Advocate, and Vote on Economic Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>less interventionist (right)</th>
<th>more interventionist (left)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>spending attitudes</td>
<td>co/sponsorship scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white-collar (private-sector)</td>
<td>white-collar (gov’t / law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.69*</td>
<td>13.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.77**</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-7.31</td>
<td>-6.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bars represent estimated differences from regressions relating the variable in question to occupational indicators (blue-collar was the omitted category) and party indicators. Spending attitudes measure the percent of seven government programs each legislator personally felt should receive the same or less funding. Co/sponsorship scores measure the percent of economic bills each legislator sponsored or cosponsored that were rightist. Voting scores are ideal points based on roll-call votes (rescaled here to range from 0 to 100). The significance level of the estimated difference between lawmakers from the occupational group in question and lawmakers from blue-collar jobs is denoted *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

Sources: USAL, Directorio Legislativo, Alemán et al. (2009), and authors’ data.

set of bars plots differences in roll-call-based ideal points, rescaled here to range from 0 to 100. The trends in legislators’ sponsorship scores are strikingly similar to the differences in their spending attitudes (albeit about half the size). Even with a relatively small sample, a coarse measure of sponsorship, and controls for party (a variable that may itself be driven by a person’s class and that might therefore be picking up some of the total class effect), there are statistically significant social class divisions in Argentine legislators’ sponsorship choices that mirror the gaps in their economic viewpoints. Contrary to decades of scholarly thought, lawmakers from different classes appear to think differently and behave differently.

Our analysis cannot control for public opinion, unfortunately, because there has never been a mass political attitude survey in Argentina with enough cases to generate province-level estimates. However, we have little reason to think that the findings in Figure 5 reflect differences in the kinds of districts working-class legislators represent. For one, the Argentine provinces do not differ widely in electing working-class legislators. The working-class legislators in this sample represent 23 of Argentina’s 24 provinces and never represent more than 12.5% of a province’s delegation (Argentine deputies are elected by province using closed-list proportional representation). Moreover, the differences in their choices are most pronounced when they introduce bills, an activity most constituents ignore. As a robustness check, we added province-level characteristics (i.e., the urbanization rate, the literacy rate, the proportion of the adult population working in agriculture or fishing, the proportion of the adult population working in manufacturing or mining, and the poverty rate) and additional legislator characteristics (i.e., age and gender) to the regression models used to generate Figure 5. Our findings (summarized in the middle panel of Table A8 in the online appendix) were nearly identical.

Since many legislators were observed more than once in our bill data—we computed counts for 2000 and 2001 separately—we clustered the standard errors in our regression models by individual legislator. Our findings were the same when we analyzed each year separately and when we averaged the two.
ideology (the best measure in the USAL data set). It predicts large and statistically significant differences in legislators’ views. In the models for sponsorship and voting, we use party bloc indicators. Again, we find large differences: Legislators from the left-leaning parties like FREPASO cast significantly more leftist votes and introduce more leftist bills than legislators from parties like the right-wing Action for the Republic (AR) party. In short, the models behind Figure 5 seem to do a good job of accounting for the major political divisions in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies.

Taken at face value, the social class divisions in bill sponsorship documented in Figure 5 are striking, especially in light of the tight party discipline in Argentina. On average, approximately 21% of the economic bills introduced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in 2000–2001 were rightist (as opposed to leftist or neutral). If the occupational makeup of the Chamber of Deputies had been identical to that of the country as a whole (holding constant the partisan makeup of the legislature), only about 16% of economic bills would have been rightist. Although scholars have long maintained that the social class makeup of the world’s legislatures is irrelevant, these data suggest that even in a setting where parties are strong, white-collar government means that there were approximately 50 extra rightist proposals in one legislative session alone. It is impossible to know exactly how these bills might have affected the final result of the legislative process, but ideas usually have narrow windows of opportunity (Kingdon [1984] 2011)—the overrepresentation of white-collar professionals in Latin American legislatures means that there are more lawmakers ready to act when the time is right for the right-wing policies that more affluent citizens tend to prefer and fewer to advocate pro-worker policy when conditions are right. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, legislators from different classes bring different perspectives to the process, and often act on them, at least in the less visible pre-voting stages of the legislative process.

On center stage, however, lawmakers from different classes are essentially indistinguishable. As the third set of bars in Figure 5 illustrates, class-based differences in Argentine legislators’ roll-call voting scores were essentially nonexistent. If anything, legislators from white-collar occupations appeared slightly more leftist by this measure. When parties have less influence and legislators have more leeway—as they do when legislators introduce bills—class-based differences in legislative attitudes seem to matter. In sharp contrast, when parties have more influence—as they do when legislators cast their votes—class seems to be irrelevant.

If we focused only on legislative voting, we would have no basis for thinking that the social class makeup of the Argentine legislature was important. We would overlook social class divisions in how legislators think and in how they behave during the pre-voting stages of the legislative process. As many scholars have done before, we would seriously underestimate the importance of class in the legislative process.

Class and the Comparative Study of Elites

Decades ago, comparative scholars largely gave up on studying the social class backgrounds of political elites. Many still see elites as central to processes ranging from regime transitions to economic reforms (e.g., Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007; Higley and Gunther 1992; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Yet, for years, scholars paid little attention to the classes those elites came from.

This inattention partly reflects a legitimate interest in other things: institutions, parties, interest groups, constituents, campaigns, and so on. But it also partly reflects the misguided choices of many studies in the first wave of research on the social class makeup of legislatures. Many made serious methodological missteps—and ultimately discouraged comparative scholars from paying attention to the class compositions of the world’s political institutions.

Measured properly, data on legislators’ class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices tell a coherent story. It is a story that may seem unsurprising. And yet it is a story at odds with more than four decades of scholarly thought about the unequal representation of social classes. Like ordinary citizens, legislators from different classes bring different views about economic issues with them to office. When external actors like political parties force their hands—as they often do when bills are put to a vote—legislators from different classes behave about the same. But when they have discretion—as they often do during the agenda-setting stages of the legislative process—their choices on economic issues differ by class.

In other words, class matters some of the time. Even in countries like Argentina, with highly disciplined parties, class seems to affect what happens before the votes are cast, the stages of the legislative process in which problems are identified, solutions are crafted, and the legislative agenda is set.

These links between class and legislative conduct would be less important if the descriptive representation of social classes in the world’s legislatures were roughly balanced. However, as we have known for decades, lawmakers all over the world are significantly better off than the people they represent. The class-based differences in
legislative attitudes and behaviors documented here are an important source of representational inequality: Social class inequalities in the makeup of legislatures bias the policymaking process toward dealing with the problems more privileged citizens care about and addressing them the way more privileged citizens would prefer. The unequal descriptive representation of social classes affects the substantive representation of those classes’ interests.

The findings reported here represent an important break from the first wave of comparative research on class and legislative conduct, but a great deal more work remains. Our analysis of legislative attitudes focused on a single region, and our analysis of legislative conduct focused on a single country. These were useful starting points, and we see no reason to expect our theory not to hold elsewhere, but our analysis should be replicated in other countries and time periods. The effects of inequalities in the social makeup of the world’s legislatures deserve considerably more scholarly attention.

These inequalities may also hold the keys to many pressing questions in the field of comparative politics. Why do highly unequal democracies fail to redistribute wealth? Why do government policies fail to reflect citizens’ preferences? Scholars of labor-based parties have noted that the proportion of working-class legislators in their ranks has been declining since the 1970s (e.g., Best and Cotta 2000; Levitsky 2003). Perhaps this is one reason some of these parties subsequently moderated their economic platforms (e.g., Kitschelt 1994; Stokes 2001).

Our findings also suggest that comparative scholars should pay more attention to the origins of inequalities in the class compositions of legislatures. If the underrepresentation of the working class is politically consequential, why is the working class so sharply underrepresented? Why do democracies all over the world consistently elect such an unbalanced group of lawmakers? For decades, many scholars have mistakenly believed that questions like these are unimportant. It is time we begin asking them.

References

Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2012. “Gender and Political Backgrounds in Argentina.” In The Impact of Gender Quotas, ed. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook,


Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s website:

Figure A1: The Class Distributions of Argentine Legislators in the USAL Survey and the Directorio Legislativo Dataset

Table A1: Occupational Coding for LAPOP Data
Table A2: Occupational Coding for USAL, ILO, and Directorio Legislativo Data
Table A3: Replicating State Functions Analysis (with Controls) in Table 1 using Alternative Dependent Variables

Table A4: Replicating Social Spending Analysis (with Controls) in Table 1 using Alternative Dependent Variables

Table A5: Regression Models Relating Class and Latin American Legislators’ Economic Attitudes (with Control Variables Displayed)

Table A6: Regression Models Relating Alternative Measures of Class to Latin American Legislators’ Economic Attitudes

Table A7: Regressions Relating Class and Argentine Legislators’ Economic Attitudes

Table A8: Regressions Relating Class and Argentine Legislators’ Economic Choices

Instructions for Bill Coders