Chapter 9: Nationalization and Party Institutionalization in Twentieth-Century Argentina

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9.1 Introduction

Scholars of Latin America have focused considerable attention on electoral volatility as a broad measure of the stability of voter choices over time (Coppel 1998; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Roberts and Wibbels 1999). As Torcal (this volume) notes in his introduction, greater electoral stability is thought to be an important component of highly institutionalized party systems, where voters are faced with a predictable menu of choices on Election Day and parties build stable voter bases. Indeed, according to Mainwaring and Scully (1995a: 5), institutionalized party systems exhibit “stability in the rules and nature of party competition. Patterns of party competition must manifest some regularity.” And similar definitions have been employed to examine party-system institutionalization in other new democracies (e.g., Bakke and Sitter 2005; Tavits 2005; Tavits and Annus 2006).

Other scholars have noted that levels of institutionalization vary not only across party systems, but also within systems across parties (Dix 1992; Huntington 1968; Janda 1980; Levitsky 2003; Panebianco 1988; Randall and Svanand 2002). Moreover, party institutionalization and party-system institutionalization appear to be positively correlated, though their relationship seems nonlinear (Mainwaring and Scully 1995a; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Randall and Svanand 2002; Stockton 2001). Indeed, Torcal (this volume) conceives of party institutionalization as one dimension of party-system institutionalization.

But while indexes of electoral volatility have provided scholars with a measure of party-system institutionalization, no comparable measure has been developed for the degree of institutionalization of individual parties. Indeed, scholars such as Roberts and Wibbels (1999) utilize the age of a party to measure its level of institutionalization even though party age is clearly a crude – and potentially misleading – measure of institutionalization. Moreover, we are far from consensus regarding the definition of party institutionalization. As a result, scholars have variously characterized Argentina’s Peronist party as “highly institutionalized” (Jones 1997), “weakly institutionalized” (McGuire 1997), and “poorly institutionalized” (Levitsky 2003).

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1 The chapters by Botero and Chasquetti (this volume) suggest examining the career paths of legislators to measure party institutionalization. Thames (2007) uses the degree of party discipline in legislature as a measure. While these measures are useful, the alternative proposed in this chapter requires electoral data – which is often more readily available – and parallels the volatility index by focusing on voting outcomes.

2 In fact, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) utilize the average age of the parties in a system as an indicator of party-system institutionalization, but the implication is that an individual party’s age indicates its level of institutionalization. Note that this measure can be quite misleading since, for example, the Peronist party is relatively old despite being considered – at least by some – to be characterized by low levels of institutionalization.
This chapter offers a new measure of party institutionalization – the degree to which the party is nationalized – with an application to the case of Argentina. Many scholars have explored the trends, causes, and consequences of the nationalization of party systems and of individual parties. Voter decisions can be made on the basis of either local or national factors. Whether voters choose retrospectively or prospectively, whether they are egocentric or sociotropic, the level of government from which they make their judgments affects their decision calculus. Particularly in federal systems, where state and local governments have significant impacts on individuals’ lives, our ability to identify the extent to which different levels of government matter to voters has been seen as crucial for our understanding of voter choice.

In the US context, such questions of the nationalization of the vote have engrossed political scientists for over four decades, but only recently has this literature begun to emerge in other contexts or cross-nationally. By extending the available measures of nationalization to the context of Argentina, I not only add to the emergent comparative literature on the nationalization of the vote, but also suggest a new way of conceptualizing and measuring the degree of institutionalization of individual political parties.

This chapter thus seeks to introduce the conceptual and methodological utility of employing nationalization as a measure of party institutionalization through a close examination of the Argentine case. I make the conceptual argument that a measure of the relative nationalization of an individual party can usefully be employed as a proxy for its organizational institutionalization. I then calculate this measure for the two main Argentine parties over the course of a long sweep of history and examine the general patterns this analysis uncovers.

In addition, this chapter addresses two other objectives. First, I use this measure to demonstrate that the determinants of institutionalization may differ among parties, even within the same system. Drawing on previous theories, I test some explanations of party institutionalization and find very different results for each party. Although this analysis is not intended as a conclusive test of previous theories, I use it to demonstrate the need for further conceptual work on the causes of party institutionalization and their variation across types of political parties.

A final objective is to examine the relationship between the institutionalization of individual parties and that of the party system as a whole. My analysis of the Argentine parties
suggests that within Argentina, the institutionalization of one party can contribute more than the other to the institutionalization of the system of a whole. Moreover, which party contributes to party-system institutionalization appears to shift over time. Again, my analysis on this score is not intended to be conclusive, but rather to suggest the need for theoretical work the complex effect of party institutionalization on party-system institutionalization.

9.2 Conceptual Framework

The terms nationalization and institutionalization are both ambiguous and have been used by scholars to refer to a wide variety of concepts. In this section I define these terms as they are used here and justify the use of nationalization as a measure of party institutionalization.

Institutionalization

Torcal (this volume) offers a useful multidimensional definition of party-system institutionalization in an update to the seminal definition offered by Mainwaring and Scully (1995a). One dimension of this measure is the organizational institutionalization of the individual parties within the system.

The definition of party institutionalization in political science has diverged between what Bae (2003) calls rule-oriented and organization-oriented approaches. Rule-oriented approaches to institutionalization tend to analyze the patterns of behavior within organizations, discerning the extent to which interactions and rules have been routinized or entrenched. North (1990: 4) thus argues that organizations become “analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport,” structuring behavior on the basis of patterns. Institutions in turn become the routinization of the “rules and norms formally and informally embodied in those patterns” (O’Donnell 1994: 59). The institutionalization of organizations like political parties therefore occurs as behaviors and expectations become regularized and predictable. Routinization also allows individuals a certain level of stable expectations, minimizing the costs of internal conflicts and of external monitoring. Thus Levitsky (2003) notes that routinization tends to make organization “sticky” in that they cannot change as quickly as underlying preferences.

On the other hand, organization-oriented approaches take the party as the unit of analysis,

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3 Randall and Svåsand (2002) offer a multidimensional conception of party institutionalization that synthesizes these approaches.
focusing on the structure of the organization. They associate institutionalization with what McGuire (1997) calls value-infusion, by which organizations take on intrinsic value that goes beyond the individual pursuits of particular objectives. Thus, as organizations institutionalize, members weaken their commitment to the original goals of the organization and strengthen their commitment to preserving the organization itself, a process Huntington (1968) saw as beneficial to stability and Michels (1959) saw as detrimental to mass interests.

Organization-oriented approaches also emphasize the complexity of the organization itself. For Huntington (1968), institutionalization occurs as hierarchical and function subunits multiply within the party subunits become increasingly differentiated. For Panebianco (1988), institutional complexity is instead a function of the centralization and concentration of power in the party apparatus. As Mainwaring (1999: 27) summarizes, “It is a sign of greater system institutionalization if party structures are firmly established, are territorially comprehensive, are well organized, and have resources of their own.”

At stake in the definition of institutionalization is more than a mere analytical disagreement. Scholars have linked party institutionalization with democratic consolidation. Diamond (1999: 65) defines consolidation as “the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine.” One of Diamond’s key dimensions along which consolidation must take place for the security of democracy is that of institutionalization. Political institutions, he argues, “must become more coherent, capable, and autonomous” (20). Indeed, authors have long held that institutionalized political parties are necessary for democratic consolidation (Huntington 1968; Norden 1998; Sartori 1976; see also Kitschelt, Hawkins, Luna, Rosas, and Zechmeister 2010).

But how we measure institutionalization depends in large part on what we think we are measuring. My interest here is not in the adaptive capacities of parties suggested by Levitsky and Murillo (2003), but in the degree to which parties achieve Diamond’s “broad and deep legitimation.” That is, I take an organization-oriented definition of party institutionalization. Parties that are more institutionalized should have coherent organizations that are able to penetrate politics broadly.
9.2.1 Nationalization

Nearly five decades ago, Schattschneider (1960) identified the nationalization of the vote, beginning in the 1930s, as a major shift in US politics. One of the major consequences of nationalization, he argued, was that it made more probable the alternation of power. “The nationalization of politics,” he wrote, “by increasing the likelihood of relatively frequent alternations of the parties in power, greatly enhances the importance of elections and of electioneering political organizations” (92). By making elections more important, nationalization therefore induced parties to forge stronger bonds with voters. Given Schattschneider’s normative interest in the theory of responsible government, therefore, nationalization seemed to be a step in the right direction: parties would be more likely to respond to and anticipate voter opinion, forcing it to adopt policies that will benefit its constituents.

Indeed, as Stokes (1965) later noted, the distinction between nationalized voting and local voting parallels that between models of responsible party government and those of constituency-service or pork barrel politics.

Moreover, a nationalized electorate would seem to forge stronger ties between legislators of the same party, rather than pulling them apart on the basis of local issues (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Stokes 1967). And we might expect that the more nationalized the vote by which legislators are elected, the greater the ability of executives to form legislative coalitions and therefore to govern (Jones and Mainwaring 2003). By implication, then, the more nationalized a party, the more responsive it should be.

Scholars of US politics have examined variations in nationalization as revealing other, longer-term electoral trends. Stokes (1967) found that the US electorate became increasingly parochial during the last three decades of the nineteenth century and then increasingly nationalized from 1900 to the 1950s. He attributed this latter trend to changes in mass communication, noting that, “the rise of printed and broadcast media disseminating news to huge urban and hinterland audiences, of which any one congressional district is a small part, has worsened the lot of the congressional candidate” (197). These results were contested by later authors (Bartels 1998; Brady, D’Onofrio, and Fiorina 2000; Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale 1984; Vertz, Frendreis, and Gibson 1987), but their various analyses suggest that elections in the US became increasingly nationalized during the Vietnam era and again during the 1990s.

Comparative scholars are also increasingly interested broadly in changing patterns of
voters' support, and particularly in questions of nationalization. In a study of Western European polities, Caramani (2004) found that, “over a century and a half, politics in Europe transformed toward deterritorialization or nationalization” (290). At the same time, other authors have found that within countries, nationalization levels have homogenized across districts; that is, electoral distributions look increasingly similar from district to district within European countries (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; Rose and Urwin 1975). A similar story is told by Chhibber and Kollman (2004) for whom political and economic centralization is the causal mechanism for nationalization. Thus it seems that, at least among the older democracies of the world with their stable party systems, a trend toward nationalization is the norm.

Some scholars have turned to nationalization as measure of party stability. The greater apparent nationalization of older political parties in older democracies suggests to authors like Jones and Mainwaring (2003) that a more nationalized electorate is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy, a frequent preoccupation of observers of new democracies. Given that developed democracies appear to have become more nationalized over time, we might indeed expect newer democracies to follow suit as they consolidate. If we believe Stokes’s (1965) speculation that nationalization is spurred by technological advancement, we might also expect nationalization to increase as countries develop economically, suggesting a potential mechanism for theories of modernization. Moreover, if the stability of party systems is in some measure determined by the ability of voters to coordinate beyond the district level (Roussias 2009; Tavits and Annus 2006), then nationalization may indeed indicate a more consolidated and strategic electorate (Cox 1997).

The empirical results of nationalization studies in Latin America are mixed, especially with regard to Argentina. Using a Gini coefficient measure, Jones and Mainwaring (2003) find that Argentina is a case of low nationalization. Even though the main political parties – the Unión Cívica Radical (Radicals) and Justicialist Party (Peronists) – have “intermediate to high” party nationalization scores, small provincial parties make the overall system appear less nationalized. Alemán and Kellam (2008) similarly find Argentina to exhibit intermittent nationalization. Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) find similar results for the main parties in terms of “district-time” effects – that is, a high level of common movement across districts between elections – but high volatility for the Radicals and low volatility for the Peronists.

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4 The US appears as a case of intermediate nationalization with a score of 0.84 compared to Argentina’s 0.72.
Using survey rather than electoral data, Gélineau and Remmer (2005) find that Argentine provincial elections, like US state elections, function largely as “referendums on presidential policies” (145), suggesting a nationalized vote.5

9.2.2 Nationalization and Party Institutionalization

Schattschneider’s (1960) broad definition of nationalization encapsulated two distinct features: (1) the degree to which the distribution of votes at the district level parallels that of the national level, and (2) the degree to which district-level shifts in the distribution of votes from one election to the next parallel national-level shifts.6

Under the first conceptualization, a nationalized electorate is one in which districts converge toward the national distribution of votes (Kawato 1987), or voters are homogeneously distributed across the country (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005). In cases of high nationalization, then, electoral competition follows a relatively similar pattern across districts. In cases of low nationalization, certain parties may succeed in particular districts but are all but irrelevant at the national level. Thus nationalized electorates are those in which regional cleavages are less salient than national political issues, potentially a more normatively appealing situation from the perspective of democratic theory.

The second conceptualization of nationalization— which Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) call district-time effects and Caramani (2004) calls uniform swings—turns instead on the common movement of voter behavior between elections. “The universality of political trends,” Schattschneider writes, “is an index of the nationalization of the political system. Does the same trend appear throughout the country, or do conflicting trends appear?” The basic variable of interest is the degree of similarity between the electoral swings in each district and the overall electoral shift at the national level. A nationalized electorate is one that responds uniformly to political “forces” (Stokes 1965, 1967). Such common response can occur despite a high degree of heterogeneity in the partisan makeup of districts.

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5 These studies are limited both temporally and spatially. Temporally, all three studies cover only recent Argentine elections: Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Alemán and Kellam (2008) use data for only the most recent period of Argentine democracy (1983-2001), Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) use data for a subset of these elections (1991-1999), and Gélineau and Remmer (2005) use surveys conducted only in 1999. Moreover, the two studies utilizing electoral data disaggregate voting only to the level of Argentina’s 24 provinces. I therefore also make an empirical contribution to the literature on Argentina, both in the broad historical sweep of elections that I consider and in my disaggregation of electoral results to the department, a unit roughly equivalent to US counties.

6 Caramani (2004) distinguishes these as horizontal and vertical processes.
I argue that a measure of nationalization as common movement can be usefully related to party institutionalization. Recent discussion of nationalization in Argentina has largely focused on district heterogeneity, the first conception of nationalization above (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Leiras 2006). These scholars have been concerned about the territorialization of political parties, whereby political parties have fragmented into province-level organizations with little coherent national penetration.

However, while nationalization as district heterogeneity has been useful in identifying the emergence of regional cleavages or regional party machines, I am concerned here with nationalization as common movement. Regardless of the underlying composition of a district, the degree to which it follows national trends in proportional terms is a more appropriate measure of its equal and deep penetration across the country. Particularly in the context of new democracies, the institutionalization of parties implies proportionality in electoral shifts across the polity. Where such shifts diverge, we might therefore see evidence of low party institutionalization.

9.3 Data and Methods

I consider a party’s vote in a particular district to be composed of four elements: (1) an underlying level of support that carries over from the previous election, (2) a national component that reflects broad shifts of opinions in a particular election, (3) a province-level component reflecting common shifts across departments within a particular province, and (4) a local, department-level component reflecting idiosyncratic forces, such as demography or spillover effects from municipal elections. In most specifications of such an analysis – including Stokes’s own components-of-variance method and subsequent refinements (Bartels 1998; Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005; Morgenstern and Swindle 2005) – the first three components are measured and the last given by the residual unexplained component of the vote distribution.

An array of measures of nationalization has been developed. Most measure nationalization at the level of the party system as a whole (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Kasuya and Mienius 2008; Mienius and Kasuya 2004), cross-sectionally across parties at each election

7 Inter alia, the standard deviation of a party’s vote share (Schattschneider 1960), the mean squared deviation or mean absolute deviation (Rose and Urwin 1975) and the latter’s variants (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996), the variability coefficient (Caramani 2004), the number of parties (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Kasuya and Mienius 2008), the cumulative regional inequality index (Rose and Urwin 1975), and the Gini index (Bochsler 2009; Jones and Mainwaring 2003).
(Jones and Mainwaring 2003), or across time for each individual party (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005; Morgenstern and Swindle 2005). I use here a modification of the method first introduced by Stokes (1965, 1967) and subsequently employed by Bartels (1998), which provides a measure of nationalization for each party at each election.

I use a large dataset of election returns by department (a unit similar to US counties) from 34 national elections dating from 1912 to 2003. I draw observations from over 500 departments which, multiplied by 34 elections, yield over 17,000 observations and allow a far more disaggregated view of voting than any previous study of elections in Argentina. Figure 9.1 shows the national electoral results of the major Argentine parties over the course of this period.

I develop two models for measuring the level of nationalization for each of the two major parties in Argentina – the Radicals and the Peronists. These are:

\[
R_{dpt} = \alpha + \beta_1 R_{dpt-1} + \beta_2 R_{dpt-2} + \gamma_{pt} + \mu_{dpt} \tag{1}
\]
\[
P_{dpt} = \alpha + \beta_1 P_{dpt-1} + \beta_2 P_{dpt-2} + \gamma_{pt} + \mu_{dpt} \tag{2}
\]

where \(R_{dpt}\) and \(P_{dpt}\) represent the Radical and Peronist vote shares, respectively, in department \(d\) within province \(p\) at election year \(t\). \(R_{dpt-1}, R_{dpt-2}, P_{dpt-1}, \) and \(P_{dpt-2}\) represent these vote shares in the same department in the preceding two elections (\(t-1\) and \(t-2\)). Unlike Bartels (1998), I use the vote share for each party rather than vote margin as my dependent variable. This assumes that the vote for other parties would be evenly split by the main two parties if those other parties had (counter-factually) not run. I believe this assumption is more appropriate to the Argentine case than Bartels' assumption that this vote would counter-factually go predominantly to one party or the other, as is perhaps more appropriate in US instances of "third" parties.

The parameters in equations (1) and (2) correspond directly to the four components of the vote already mentioned. The \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\) parameters on lagged vote shares reflect standing partisan

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8 These 34 national elections include 18 elections for national deputies, 13 presidential elections, and two elections for constituent assemblies. Details on coding are provided in Lupu and Stokes (2009).

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10 Alemán and Kellam (2008) suggest that in the context of multiparty systems scholars use the method of seemingly-unrelated regression rather than estimating separate models for each party. While this method is certainly more convenient when one is examining a large number of parties, it requires making assumptions about a "typical" district in order to predict substantively meaningful results in terms of vote shares. This may be less problematic when examining elections over a short period of time, as Alemán and Kellam (2008) do, but seems misleading in an analysis across nearly a century of elections.
loyalties carrying over from prior elections. The intercept parameter $\pm_t$ reflects the overall vote shift attributable to national electoral forces in a particular election since this term is constant across all departments. $^3_{pt}$ represents an election-specific parameter for province $p$. Lastly, the stochastic variance $\tilde{A}_{dpt}$ reflects the magnitude of new department-level forces in a particular election.

I run separate weighted least squares (WLS) regressions for each election, where each department is weighted by the total number of voters in that department - that is, the denominator in the vote-share calculation. Given the two-election lags, the models begin with 1918 for the Radicals and December 1948 for the Peronists. Given that data is available only for certain provinces in the earlier period of the twentieth century, and that Argentina incorporated more and more territory over the course of the period, the number of departments varies somewhat between elections, but the generally high number of observations makes large-sample inferences possible.

Note that since the partisan component of the vote is included in the model, the relationship among national, provincial, and departmental forces is not immediately apparent from the regression results. That is, a decline in the effect of national forces need not imply an equal increase in provincial and departmental forces. However, we are interested here in measuring the nationalization of the vote as opposed to its regionalization or localization. To that end, I follow Bartels (1998) in also calculating the relative nationalization of the vote ($N$) at election $t$ as follows:

$$N_t = \frac{\pm^2_t}{(\pm^2_t + ^3_{pt} + \tilde{A}^2_{dpt})}.$$

(3)

Each of the three variance components ($\pm_t$, $^3_{pt}$, and $\tilde{A}_{dpt}$) is squared in order to ensure positive values. By equation (3), relative nationalization is simply the squared national portion of the variance divided by the total squared variance. In other words, relative nationalization measures the contribution of national forces to variation in vote shares from election to election.

### 9.4 General Patterns of Nationalization

The results of the year-by-year WLS regressions are presented in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 for the Radicals and Peronists respectively. The second column in each table shows the square root of the estimated stochastic term ($\tilde{A}_{dpt}$) in percentage points, taken to reflect the departmental component of the vote. The third column shows the average of the estimated provincial vote-
swings ($^{3}_p$), also in percentage points. The third column shows the estimated national changes in
the vote share for each election ($\pm$), again in terms of percentage points. The fourth and fifth
columns show the estimated persistence of department-level outcomes from the previous election
($^{2}_1$ and $^{2}_2$), with their sum in the sixth column. Lastly, the final column reports the number of
department observations used in each regression.

[Tables 9.1 and 9.2 here]

To take an example, the first two rows of Table 9.1 show the components of the 1918 and
1920 Radical votes. The subnational component of the two votes is relatively similar, though it
seems to have grown somewhat by 1920. At the same time, the provincial component grew
more than three-fold, and the national component nearly doubled. This is perhaps unsurprising
to students of Argentine history since the 1920 elections of national deputies represented the
climax of the eight-year rise of Radical representatives. The electoral reforms of 1912 had
expanded suffrage rights and ensured secret and obligatory voting in Argentina. Although
intended by President Roque Sáenz Peña (1910-14) to ensure future rule by conservative
oligarchs, the reforms in fact aided the emergence of a movement of small landholders and urban
poor mobilized by the Radical party, Argentina's first mass national party. That movement
resulted first in the election of a Radical president in 1916, then in the capture of the important
governorship of the province of Buenos Aires in 1918, and, after the election of 1920, in the
institutionalization of Radical electoral domination, at least until electoral fraud became
widespread in the 1930s.

On the basis of the results in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 we can therefore explore long-term
patterns in nationalization across the twentieth century in Argentina. Figure 9.2 illustrated
graphically the stability of partisan attachments from one election to the next for the Radicals
and Peronists. Given Argentina’s frequent interruptions of democracy, the dotted lines in these
figures represent years of transition back to democracy. Since we are interested in the long-
terms trends illustrated in these figures, these figures also show a moving average of the values

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Based on the historical literature (e.g., Romero 2002), I code the following periods as democratic: 1912-30, 1937-
studies (Boix 2003; Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñan 2001; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000)
in that I consider democratic the period of Perón's first term (1946-50) in which relatively free and fair elections
were held but in which no alternation of executive power occurred. The opposition Radical party was active and
relatively free during this period, suggesting that voters could anticipate an opposition victory and would therefore
be likely to vote on the basis of personal preference rather than limited choice.
over the course of the elections in the sample. The picture of partisanship that emerges from Figure 9.2 is one of remarkable long-term stability. Although these models do not account for a multitude of other factors that may affect the electoral effect of partisanship from one election to the next, party attachments seem overall to be quite strong for both of the Argentine parties, as the conventional wisdom suggests. Before the rise of Peronism, the Radical vote appears to have declined – presumably because of widespread electoral fraud in the 1930s and the party’s official abstention from a number of those elections – and then recovered. Since then, the Radical vote appears to have been relatively stable, peaking in the 1993 election for national deputies, when presumably only the staunchest Radicals continued to vote for the party whose president had resigned in 1989 amid a hyperinflationary crisis. Unsurprisingly, that stability seems to have eroded in the late 1990s and 2000s, when the party first formed an electorally successful left-wing alliance with the Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente por un País Solidario, FREPASO), but then oversaw a deep economic crisis that all but destroyed the national party.

Meanwhile, the Peronist vote exhibits less fluctuation in partisanship, a finding consistent with Lupu and Stokes (2010). Although attachments with the party certainly seem to have declined slightly when the party was proscribed during the late 1950s and early 1960s, they have remained relatively consistent until the recent period of democracy. This suggests that the Peronist party was able to maintain partisan allegiances, perhaps through the orders Perón himself gave to his followers from exile in Paraguay (see Snow 1965), or because of its links with organized labor. After redemocratization in 1983, however, the Peronist party seems to have achieved a significant expansion of its partisan base, mostly during the transformative presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-99) (see Levitsky 2003).

Figure 9.3 illustrates the components of variance in Radical and Peronist vote shares – that is, the proportions of the vote that can be attributed to national, provincial, and departmental forces. As in Figure 9.2, the long-term trends are represented by moving averages.

Three results are immediately striking about these graphs. First, the departmental

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12 The moving average is calculated as a locally weighted (lowess) regression (see Beck and Jackman 1998; Jacoby 2000), with a bandwidth of 0.3.
component of the vote in Argentina is relatively small throughout the twentieth century and varies little from election to election. Second, the provincial component, though somewhat higher, is also relatively small and clearly less volatile than the national component. The national component appears to fluctuate most, and much more for the Radicals than for the Peronists, although that fluctuation seems to decrease for the Radicals over the course of the century.

Still, the conventional historical narrative supports these fluctuating results. The most nationalized elections for the Radicals are all unsurprising: the 1940 election that marked the Radicals’ last electoral victory before the emergence of Peronism, the 1958 election following the proscription of the Peronists, the 1983 election that witnessed the first Radical victory against a Peronist presidential candidate, and the 1999 election of Radical president Fernando de la Rúa under the alliance with FREPA SO.

The Peronists’ most nationalized elections are also unsurprising: the 1948 legislative elections at the height of Juan Perón’s power, the 1973 elections that saw his dramatic return to Argentina, and the 2003 election in which three Peronist candidates competed and captured the top three shares of the vote.

Still, the trend we are most concerned with here is that of relative nationalization rather than absolute levels of the national component of the vote. Here the results seem to provide a more sobering picture of the development of the major Argentine parties. Figure 9.4 illustrates relative nationalization levels for the two parties across the century. Again, moving averages are shown to give a sense of the long-term trends.

[Figure 9.4 here]

The general patterns for the two parties are instructive. The Radicals appear to see a general decline in relative nationalization during the period of the party’s electoral consolidation, but recover with the emergence of Peronism and Perón’s presidency, the period that established two-party competition in Argentina. That recovery, however, is short-lived, since Peronist proscription in the late 1950s appears to have brought another decline. But the Radical party again recovered in terms of relative nationalization over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in its 1983 presidential victory. Since then, the Radicals have shown a precipitous

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13 The unprecedented landslide victory of Radical Raúl Alfonsín is thought to have been caused by the economic disasters of the 1970s under Isabel Perón (1974-76), the subsequent military dictatorship, and internal divisions within the Peronist party (Foweraker 1984).
decline in relative nationalization.

The Peronist party exhibits similar long-term trends. The party’s initial national sweep in the 1940s erodes quickly, but the party’s relative nationalization recovers even during the period of its proscription. Still, the party’s relative nationalization begins to decline during the 1970s and continues to decline until its transformation in the 1990s. Time will tell whether the Peronist’s apparent recovery since the 1990s has indeed been sustained in the 2000s.\footnote{Electoral data for more recent elections has yet to be made available at the level of disaggregation utilized here.}

What seems clear, then, is that the recent period of democracy in Argentina has witnessed a decline in the relative nationalization of both parties. This decline is perhaps unsurprising during such a tumultuous period of the twin transitions of democratic consolidation and neoliberal reform. But this no doubt explains why previous authors, focusing on the post-1983 period, have characterized the current Argentine party system as one of intermittent (Alemán and Kellam 2008) or overall low levels of nationalization (Jones and Mainwaring 2003).

Moreover, the recent trends in relative nationalization seems to coincide with previous authors’ observation of the deinstitutionalization of the Argentine parties (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Leiras 2006). That is, relative nationalization does here appear to be a useful metric through which to measure the level of institutionalization of individual parties, at least as I have defined these concepts above.

\section*{9.5 Explaining Party Institutionalization}

More than illustrating general trends, however, these measures allow us to develop explanations for changes over time in the institutionalization of individual parties. Despite a growing interest in the last decade in political parties and specifically in their institutionalization, the determinants of institutionalization are rarely analyzed, and, as already mentioned, usually done at the level of the party system.

Using relative nationalization as a measure of party institutionalization, I test the following four propositions drawn from both the intuition behind previous studies and theories of institutionalization.

Proposition 1: Authoritarianism reduces parties’ levels of institutionalization. Authoritarian periods no doubt preclude party organizations from having broad and deep organization roots, either because they were repressed during these periods or because of the
regime obviated the party’s main activity of voter mobilization. Thus we might assume that a
democratic interruption might be associated with lower levels of institutionalization.

**Proposition 2:** Parties exhibit higher levels of institutionalization around presidential
elections than around more local elections. Given both the enormous power of executives
within political parties and the wide visibility of presidential candidates in the media, presidential
elections are more likely to force party organizations to solidify. Presidential candidates may
reign in the undisciplined and fragmentary activities of local candidates and subnational party
elites, thus creating a more institutionalized organization.

**Proposition 3:** The longer a period of democracy persists, the more institutionalized
parties should be. If parties learn over the course of their electoral experiences, then we might
expect that the passage of time under democracy to induce parties to become increasingly
strategic and to develop progressively more institutional roots in society. Thus age of democracy
may be associated with greater institutionalization.

**Proposition 4:** Higher levels of development will force parties to institutionalize.
Modernization theorists have long posited that democratic values and norms become more
prevalent as societies become wealthier. One could easily imagine that these developments
would also force parties to develop closer organization ties to voters and therefore to
institutionalize.

Table 9.3 reports the results of simple OLS regressions using dummy variables for
transitional and presidential elections, the age of democracy (that is, the number of years since
the last transitional election), and logged values of GDP (from International Financial Statistics).
The dependent variable here is the level of institutionalization of each of the two Argentine
parties, measured using relative nationalization.

[Table 9.3 here]

The results clearly illustrate the analytical benefit of utilizing this measure of party
institutionalization. While none of the variables is statistically significant in the case of the
Radical party, they all show statistically significant effects for the Peronist party. Peronist
institutionalization indeed appears to decrease following periods of authoritarianism, increase
around presidential elections, and grow over the course of periods of democracy. However, the
Peronist party seems to become less institutionalized as GDP grows, perhaps an outcome of its
relative reliance on poor votes (see Lupu and Stokes 2009) or its greater reliance on state
resources for mobilization (see Calvo and Murillo 2004).

But the case-specific findings here are secondary. The more salient point is that the results are far from identical for the two Argentine parties. This suggests that studies of institutionalization must begin to examine individual parties more closely. The distinction between the Radical and Peronist parties in Argentina may be due to their different ideologies or electoral bases, or they may simply represent different types of parties that are more or less prone to organizational changes. Only more comparative studies across different countries will be able to adjudicate among these and other possible explanations, but what appears clear from the Argentine case is that the causes of party institutionalization may well vary across parties or party types.

9.6 Party Institutionalization and Party-System Institutionalization

A final objective laid out at the beginning of this chapter was to examine the relationship between individual party institutionalization and the broader institutionalization of the party system, with which this volume is broadly concerned. As Randall and Svåsand (2002) rightly point out, “there is a tendency to elide the issue of party institutionalization with that of party system institutionalization, the implication being that the institutionalization of single parties must contribute to the overall institutionalization of the party system” (6). Indeed, while party institutionalization and party-system institutionalization are positively correlated, the relationship is often nonlinear (Mainwaring and Scully 1995a; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Stockton 2001).

Instead, as Torcal (this volume) notes, the institutionalization of individual parties should be treated as one dimension of the institutionalization of the system as a whole. Using my measure of party institutionalization, I now turn to a brief examination of this relationship. Figure 9.5 redraws the trends in party institutionalization of the two Argentine parties measured as their levels of relative nationalization (as in Figure 9.4). But this figure also includes the trend line in party-system institutionalization measured as the level of electoral stability. This allows for a comparison of the party institutionalization trend lines with the trend in party-system institutionalization.

As a proxy for party-system institutionalization, I measure electoral stability in the usual fashion, using one minus the Pedersen index of electoral volatility. The index of volatility is generally operationalized as one-half of the sum of changes in vote shares for all parties from
one election to the next ($\frac{1}{2} | \pi_t - \pi_{t-1} |$). Volatility therefore is the aggregate percentage of the vote that shifts among parties from one election to the next. In order to invert the volatility measure to stability (so as to be easier to compare with relative nationalization), I take one minus the volatility measure.

[Figure 9.5 here]

The trends in Figure 9.5 are instructive. Prior to the emergence of Peronism, the systemic level of institutionalization clearly follows the trend in the institutionalization of the Radical party, suggesting that competing parties, like the Socialist and various conservative parties, contributed little to systemic institutionalization. This trend appears to continue through Perón’s first presidency and into the period of proscription, though Radical party institutionalization and party-system institutionalization co-vary less tightly than in the earlier period, and the de-institutionalization of the Peronist party in the late 1950s seems to have a particularly large effect on systemic institutionalization. In the more recent period of democracy, the Radical party again appears to drive the level of institutionalization of the system as a while, with the de-institutionalization of that party strongly associated with the de-institutionalization of the system.

It appears, then, that in the Argentine case the Radical party has been the primary contributor to the institutionalization of the Argentine party system. This may be because the institutionalization of the Peronist party has fluctuated far less over time, owing perhaps to its greater ability to foster deep partisan attachments (Lupu and Stokes 2010). More importantly, however, is the implication that parties contribute differentially to the institutionalization as a whole. As this somewhat cursory examination of the Argentine case has shown, the some political parties within a system may contribute more than others to the institutionalization of the system.

9.7 Conclusion

Using disaggregated data for a longer sweep of history than those used in previous studies of nationalization in new democracies, this chapter has made several contributions. Regarding Argentine politics, contrary to previous (and more temporally circumscribed) studies that depict the Argentine electorate as only nationalized at low or intermittent levels, I find that pre-1983 Argentina was in fact relatively nationalized. For both Radicals and Peronists, voters

were often more likely to choose on the basis of national issues than subnational ones.

Second, I have argued that the level of nationalization can serve as a useful indicator of party institutionalization. Using an organization-oriented notion of party institutionalization, we would expect more institutionalized parties to have broader organizations that can penetrate equally throughout the polity. The conception of nationalization that I employ indeed examines common movements of electoral choices across districts. In the Argentine case, this measure indeed seems to correspond to what we know about the developments of the two major parties.

Third, the Argentine case illustrates the need for further theoretical developments regarding the causes of party institutionalization. Testing some of the determinants of institutionalization suggested by previous theories, I find that they hold for the Peronists and not for the Radicals. Specifically, transitional elections, presidential elections, the age of democracy, and the level of development, are all significantly associated with the level of institutionalization of the Peronist party. But none of these variables have a statistically significant association with the institutionalization of the Radicals.

Finally, a comparison of the trends in institutionalization of the individual Argentine parties and the institutionalization of the system as a whole suggested that the contribution of the Radical party to overall institutionalization was greater than that of the Peronist party. While one might speculate about the reasons for this differential effect of individual party institutionalization in the Argentine case, it nevertheless demonstrates that the relationship between the institutionalization of individual political parties and that of the system as a whole can be complex and merits further theoretical development and empirical analysis.

These findings have implications for both the empirical understanding of Argentine politics over the course of the twentieth century and for our theories of institutionalization. The two major Argentine parties experienced periods of greater and weaker levels of institutionalization that correspond to broader political developments like proscription and interruptions of democracy. But the recent period of democracy has witnessed an unprecedented deinstitutionalization of both parties. As scholars of Argentina know, this is also the period that witnessed the rise of provincial parties and the turn toward greater levels of clientelism, both of which may have been factors in this development (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Levitsky 2003). Although it is still too early to tell whether the Peronist party has managed to rebound since the economic crisis of 2001-2, the distinctiveness of this period should be more closely examined.
More broadly, my analysis suggests that we are in need of further theoretical work on party institutionalization and its relationship to party-system institutionalization. This paper has offered a methodology for measuring and comparing levels of party institutionalization, one that can be applied to contexts beyond Argentina. Indeed, cross-national comparisons using this measure will not only provide greater insights into changes in party institutionalization over time within countries, but will also allow comparative scholars to test theories about the determinants of party institutionalization and its contribution to the institutionalization of party systems.
References


Hopkins University Press.


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<th>Department forces (A)</th>
<th>Province forces (average)</th>
<th>National forces (z)</th>
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<th>Second lag ((t_2))</th>
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Note: Cell entries represent estimates derived from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9.2 Components of Peronist vote, by election

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Note: Cell entries represent estimates derived from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9.3 Determinants of party institutionalization

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<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of democracy</td>
<td>-0.00175</td>
<td>0.0273***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.0079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (ln)</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>-0.898***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>8.292***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.71</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 9.1 Major party vote shares in Argentina, 1912-2007

Note: Points represent the share of the vote received by each party at each national election. Dotted vertical lines represent transition elections that mark moments of redemocratization.
Figure 9.2 Partisan components of Radical and Peronist votes, 1918-2003

Note: Points represent the sum of partisan stability from the two previous national elections for each party based on the regression results reported in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. Lines are moving averages generated by locally weighted (lowess) regressions. Dotted vertical lines represent transition elections that mark moments of redemocratization.
Figure 9.3 National, provincial, and departmental components of Radical and Peronist votes, 1918-2003

Note: Points represent the national, provincial, and departmental components of the Radical and Peronist votes based on the regression results reported in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. Lines are moving averages generated by locally weighted (lowess) regressions. Dotted vertical lines represent transition elections that mark moments of redemocratization.
Figure 9.4 Relative nationalization of Radical and Peronist votes, 1918-2003

Note: Points represent the relative nationalization of the Radical and Peronist votes based on the regression results reported in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. Lines are moving averages generated by locally weighted (lowess) regressions. Dotted vertical lines represent transition elections that mark moments of redemocratization.
**Figure 9.5** Party institutionalization and party-system institutionalization, 1918-2003

Note: Party institutionalization measures are moving averages of relative nationalization for Radical and Peronist votes (as in Figure 9.4). Party-system institutionalization is 1 minus the Pedersen index of electoral volatility.