Online Appendix for

"What Do Voters Think About the Descriptive Underrepresentation of the Working Class?"

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Table A1 lists regressions that relate perceptions of workers' and women's representation in Argentina to the order questions were asked (the workers block was always first). There were no patterns, point estimates were substantively small, and question order was significantly associated with perceptions just one time in 15, about what we would expect by chance.

Tables A2 and A3 list question order effects in Britain, first for surveys that randomly asked about women first, then for surveys that randomly asked about workers first. Again, there were no patterns, effect sizes were small, and less than 5% of estimated effects were statistically significant.

Table A4 lists estimates of question order effects in the US. We found significant effects five times out of fifteen, but the effect sizes were substantively small, and we found nothing that altered our substantive conclusions.

Table A5 lists models relating the random block order (women first or workers first) in the Britain survey to perceptions of women's and worker's representation. Estimated effects were small—around 1 percentage point—and only one in six was significant.

Table A6 lists models relating respondents' answers about worker representation in the US survey to the randomly assigned level of government (Congress, state legislatures, or city councils). Respondents rightly thought that workers were better represented in state legislatures and in city councils than in Congress, although they substantially over-estimated worker representation at both levels, especially city councils. Nothing in these robustness tests ultimately changed our basic results.

Tables A7 through A9 report the regression models underlying the summary presented in Table 2, which relate perceived worker underrepresentation to political behavior in Argentina (Table A7), Britain (Table A8), and the US (Table A9). Tables A7 through A9 enter all control variables as linear/continuous, but models that enter controls as indicators (not reported but provided in the corresponding Stata code) reach the same substantive conclusions.

Table A1: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (Argentina)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
Public-Leg-Ideal	-0.30	5.06**	2.76	-0.17	2.16	4.64
	(1.24)	(1.58)	(1.96)	(2.31)	(2.02)	(2.82)
Public-Ideal-Leg	0.59	2.23	0.58	-2.10	0.34	-2.05
	(1.30)	(1.66)	(2.13)	(2.52)	(2.63)	(3.00)
Leg-Public-Ideal	0.37	2.52	0.46	-2.36	-0.13	4.09
	(1.46)	(1.65)	(2.12)	(2.64)	(2.22)	(3.09)
Leg-Ideal-Public	-0.26	2.44	-0.21	-3.17	-2.36	2.81
	(1.33)	(1.73)	(1.83)	(2.47)	(2.09)	(2.96)
Ideal-Public-Leg	-0.32	2.08	-1.24	-8.25**	3.80	-1.13
	(1.43)	(1.60)	(2.03)	(2.72)	(2.37)	(3.07)
Ideal-Leg-Public (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Intercept	57.56**	22.04**	46.99**	61.27**	19.27**	62.77**
	(0.97)	(1.14)	(1.60)	(1.76)	(1.40)	(1.94)
N	1,208	1,073	1,214	1,208	1,108	1,229
R^2	0.001	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.009	0.009

Source: APES (2015).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (Britain, Women Block First)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
pub-leg-ideal-imp	7.60*	2.00	-0.36	1.92	-0.97	-1.08
	(3.86)	(3.50)	(3.32)	(5.03)	(3.27)	(6.76)
leg-pub-ideal-imp	3.17	3.80	-2.69	-5.73	2.14	-4.15
	(4.82)	(3.57)	(4.12)	(5.65)	(4.91)	(6.54)
ideal-leg-imp-pub	7.91*	0.43	-2.48	-6.16	-1.35	-2.91
	(3.73)	(3.84)	(2.71)	(5.81)	(3.61)	(6.40)
ideal-pub-imp-leg	4.34	-0.14	-1.54	-15.04*	-3.36	-10.75
	(3.95)	(3.55)	(3.23)	(7.20)	(3.41)	(6.20)
pub-imp-ideal-leg	10.26**	2.37	-4.07	3.53	0.73	-5.08
	(3.21)	(3.44)	(2.84)	(5.38)	(3.79)	(6.27)
leg-imp-ideal-pub	9.76*	7.85*	-0.34	1.26	-0.51	-2.06
	(3.82)	(3.46)	(2.36)	(5.93)	(3.78)	(6.16)
pub-imp-leg-ideal	10.28**	0.24	-3.27	-0.43	-0.32	-5.71
	(3.49)	(3.35)	(2.66)	(5.36)	(4.10)	(6.79)
leg-imp-pub-ideal	2.29	7.85*	-3.68	-18.58**	0.94	-7.90
	(3.61)	(3.56)	(3.13)	(5.73)	(4.36)	(7.20)
ideal-imp-pub-leg	6.35	2.79	-1.37	-7.13	-0.10	-1.41
	(4.32)	(3.24)	(2.91)	(5.34)	(3.64)	(6.62)
ideal-imp-leg-pub	5.79	1.32	1.36	-2.66	8.10	-8.49
	(4.64)	(3.97)	(2.91)	(4.84)	(4.90)	(5.91)
imp-leg-ideal-pub	2.86	3.09	-1.35	-2.73	0.89	-3.02
	(4.20)	(3.41)	(2.70)	(5.04)	(3.44)	(5.83)
imp-pub-ideal-leg	6.43	3.86	-1.49	-19.37**	0.44	1.03
	(3.80)	(3.34)	(2.92)	(6.30)	(3.60)	(7.06)
pub-ideal-leg-imp	6.40	3.56	0.80	-1.85	1.35	0.63
	(4.13)	(4.17)	(3.44)	(4.68)	(4.35)	(5.84)
imp-ideal-leg-pub	1.18	-2.19	-6.87	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted

	(4.43)	(3.56)	(4.11)			
imp-ideal-pub-leg	7.39	4.69	-0.91	-6.71	3.88	-0.91
	(4.35)	(3.47)	(2.76)	(5.32)	(3.53)	(6.06)
imp-leg-pub-ideal	2.40	-0.92	-8.49*	2.41	-0.92	2.34
	(4.25)	(3.61)	(3.64)	(4.65)	(3.45)	(6.06)
imp-pub-leg-ideal	8.51*	5.70	-4.88	-15.36*	-4.11	-5.79
	(3.39)	(3.18)	(3.05)	(6.70)	(3.48)	(7.55)
leg-ideal-pub-imp	8.02*	2.32	-4.27	-1.15	2.82	0.82
	(3.63)	(3.52)	(3.01)	(4.90)	(3.44)	(6.22)
ideal-leg-pub-imp	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	-14.71*	-2.76	-0.24
				(6.54)	(3.89)	(7.22)
ideal-pub-leg-imp	1.11	-5.00	-6.81	-11.39*	-3.53	-3.94
	(4.07)	(3.42)	(3.79)	(5.33)	(3.33)	(7.15)
pub-leg-imp-ideal	9.37**	6.98	-1.93	0.53	0.52	-5.57
	(3.53)	(3.76)	(2.71)	(5.39)	(3.85)	(6.32)
leg-pub-imp-ideal	7.62	6.54	-3.12	-0.53	-5.92	-1.44
	(4.25)	(3.53)	(3.06)	(7.08)	(3.46)	(6.53)
pub-ideal-imp-leg	8.44*	3.88	-2.82	1.51	-6.94*	5.54
	(3.75)	(3.37)	(2.50)	(6.14)	(3.35)	(7.02)
leg-ideal-imp-pub	6.84	5.74	2.82	-7.77	-1.57	-2.76
	(3.50)	(3.50)	(2.66)	(5.12)	(4.31)	(6.33)
Intercept	35.69***	22.14***	47.35***	53.72***	18.93***	47.15***
	(3.02)	(2.82)	(1.90)	(3.61)	(2.71)	(5.08)
N	775	777	751	770	772	763
R^2	0.049	0.067	0.039	0.087	0.050	0.028

Source: YouGov UK (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (Britain, Workers Block First)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
pub-leg-ideal-imp	Omitted	Omitted	1.37	10.16	-3.76	0.93
			(4.53)	(6.40)	(4.64)	(5.76)
leg-pub-ideal-imp	5.79	5.06	4.55	6.49	-1.37	0.98
	(4.14)	(4.06)	(4.12)	(6.66)	(4.58)	(5.87)
ideal-leg-imp-pub	3.02	-0.77	-3.79	12.41	-5.65	6.74
	(3.78)	(3.59)	(4.30)	(7.19)	(4.69)	(5.89)
ideal-pub-imp-leg	0.83	0.95	1.83	11.57	3.15	2.50
	(4.39)	(3.67)	(3.89)	(7.66)	(5.85)	(7.17)
pub-imp-ideal-leg	3.03	-2.02	4.55	8.22	3.08	Omitted
	(3.67)	(3.43)	(3.98)	(7.07)	(5.70)	
leg-imp-ideal-pub	6.83	1.83	0.96	-1.02	-2.71	-6.65
	(4.19)	(3.62)	(4.21)	(8.03)	(4.98)	(6.20)
pub-imp-leg-ideal	6.64	3.00	1.66	9.56	-2.97	-2.61
	(4.31)	(3.60)	(4.05)	(6.66)	(5.08)	(5.30)
leg-imp-pub-ideal	5.67	1.85	-2.60	5.76	-2.01	-1.71
	(3.66)	(3.51)	(4.69)	(6.96)	(4.66)	(5.80)
ideal-imp-pub-leg	3.46	2.55	0.84	Omitted	Omitted	-0.72
	(3.51)	(3.88)	(3.93)			(6.69)
ideal-imp-leg-pub	5.26	1.25	0.32	5.55	-1.28	2.28
	(4.37)	(3.50)	(4.13)	(6.50)	(5.33)	(5.57)
imp-leg-ideal-pub	1.46	-0.39	-1.87	10.36	4.79	1.81
	(4.17)	(3.48)	(4.20)	(6.57)	(5.16)	(5.45)
imp-pub-ideal-leg	8.02*	-0.51	0.02	4.45	-4.28	-5.02
	(3.74)	(3.46)	(3.88)	(7.23)	(4.76)	(6.15)
pub-ideal-leg-imp	-2.81	-0.32	Omitted	11.49	0.92	4.40
	(4.39)	(3.71)		(6.97)	(5.72)	(5.71)
imp-ideal-leg-pub	0.35	-4.83	-3.04	6.95	-0.02	2.70

	(4.35)	(3.46)	(4.56)	(7.25)	(5.23)	(6.46)
imp-ideal-pub-leg	8.90*	1.41	-0.47	0.89	-0.14	-0.51
	(3.88)	(3.74)	(4.04)	(8.01)	(6.65)	(6.35)
imp-leg-pub-ideal	4.20	-3.97	2.98	12.91	-1.13	-7.66
	(3.86)	(4.21)	(4.02)	(7.10)	(4.84)	(5.49)
imp-pub-leg-ideal	2.98	-1.28	-2.04	4.96	-5.50	-3.01
	(3.87)	(3.66)	(4.19)	(6.82)	(4.98)	(6.65)
leg-ideal-pub-imp	12.10**	-3.02	2.56	12.31	3.94	3.52
	(4.17)	(3.69)	(4.06)	(6.84)	(5.66)	(5.95)
ideal-leg-pub-imp	5.28	4.54	-0.78	9.22	-2.78	3.78
	(3.79)	(3.73)	(4.44)	(6.88)	(4.98)	(6.36)
ideal-pub-leg-imp	3.58	-1.83	1.14	7.22	-3.71	0.30
	(3.79)	(3.86)	(4.13)	(7.01)	(4.46)	(6.04)
pub-leg-imp-ideal	8.63*	7.57	2.74	10.55	-0.24	-3.02
	(4.35)	(5.20)	(4.40)	(6.56)	(5.10)	(5.49)
leg-pub-imp-ideal	7.12	-0.63	-3.58	12.26	3.79	4.11
	(3.79)	(4.06)	(4.76)	(6.42)	(6.36)	(6.28)
pub-ideal-imp-leg	6.13	-0.73	4.11	11.90	-1.90	0.25
	(4.03)	(3.51)	(3.74)	(6.66)	(5.06)	(6.15)
leg-ideal-imp-pub	2.12	1.99	-2.60	18.94**	2.00	-2.85
	(4.33)	(3.75)	(4.69)	(7.01)	(5.39)	(5.70)
Intercept	35.57***	23.52***	43.29***	41.32***	19.42***	45.19***
	(2.99)	(3.05)	(3.44)	(5.92)	(4.18)	(4.76)
N	829	837	822	840	841	838
R^2	0.044	0.053	0.033	0.043	0.031	0.031

Source: YouGov UK (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (US)

	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order			
Public-Leg-Ideal (omitted)	---	---	---
Public-Ideal-Leg	-3.95	-6.66	-5.96
	(2.29)	(3.48)	(3.22)
Leg-Public-Ideal	0.12	0.64	-1.54
	(2.91)	(4.13)	(3.94)
Leg-Ideal-Public	-0.65	-1.22	-0.19
	(2.63)	(4.16)	(3.36)
Ideal-Public-Leg	-5.99	-4.92	-1.36
	(3.64)	(3.87)	(3.82)
Ideal-Leg-Public	-5.63	-8.83*	-1.96
	(3.12)	(3.65)	(3.27)
Intercept	60.96***	31.66***	59.16***
	(1.60)	(2.61)	(2.26)
N	993	987	990
R^2	0.015	0.019	0.006

Source: CCES (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Block Order (Britain)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
Women Block First	-1.36	-0.89	-1.42	1.10	-0.11	0.76
	(0.78)	(0.66)	(0.74)	(1.21)	(0.87)	(1.13)
Worker Block First (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Intercept	41.74***	25.06***	44.96***	48.73***	18.66***	44.50***
	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.52)	(0.93)	(0.58)	(0.84)
N	1,604	1,614	1,573	1,610	1,613	1,601
R^2	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.000

Source: YouGov UK (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Level of Office (US)

	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order			
Congress	---	---	---
State Legislature	-4.92*	4.85*	-3.99
	(2.49)	(2.47)	(2.66)
City Council	1.91	24.04***	1.23
	(1.92)	(2.70)	(2.63)
Intercept	59.47***	19.17***	58.41***
	(1.40)	(1.60)	(2.00)
N	993	987	990
R^2	0.019	0.153	0.008

Source: CCES (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Regression Models Relating Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (Argentina)

Dependent variable	Perceived worker underrepresentation	Political/union meeting attendance	Protest participation	Vote in recent election	Vote for Scioli	Corruption is top problem
Perceived worker underrepresentation	--	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Ideology	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Political knowledge	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Household wealth	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
Intercept	0.56*** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.90*** (0.04)	0.85*** (0.11)	-0.16* (0.07)
N	1,022	1,022	1,021	976	922	1,021
R^2	0.014	0.028	0.050	0.042	0.060	0.036

Source: APES (2015).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Regression Models Relating Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (Britain)

Dependent variable	Perceived worker underrepresentation	Political/union meeting attendance	Protest participation
Perceived worker Underrepresentation	--	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)
Ideology	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Political knowledge	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Household income	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.02 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Intercept	0.23*** (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)	0.12*** (0.03)
N	1415	1360	1376
R^2	0.046	0.050	0.041

Source: YouGov UK (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Regression Models Relating Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (US)

Dependent variable	Perceived worker under-rep	Political meeting attendance	Work for campaign or candidate	Vote in recent election	Vote for Trump	Disapprove of Congress
Perceived worker underrepresentation	--	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.09 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)
Ideology	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.20*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Political knowledge	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Household income	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Birth year	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Intercept	0.11 (1.55)	-1.34 (1.51)	-0.20 (1.68)	2.67*** (0.66)	-0.11 (2.23)	12.53*** (2.60)
N	931	779	779	734	639	930
R^2	0.023	0.050	0.057	0.026	0.512	0.191

Source: CCES (2016)
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.